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Article for TAF blog (Draft)
17 June 2012
Bucking the System, Concentrating the Vote?
Introduction
The nature of the electoral system in
Timor-Leste is the primary focus of this article. The substantive argument made
here is that while the electoral system does encourage fragmentation and
proliferation in the party system, there are three major countervailing factors
that are likely to produce results that contradict the commonly anticipated
outcomes of such an electoral system. To be more specific, the proportional
representation model employed in Timor-Leste is unlikely to produce a
parliament consisting of a large number of parties with small numbers of seats.
Based on a prediction of the likely results of the 2012 parliamentary election,
drawn primarily from the results of the 2012 presidential election, this
article concludes that Timor-Leste is going to experience a further increase
–compared to 2007 - in the amount of the vote that is directed towards just
three parties: FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste),
CNRT (National Congress for the Reconstruction of Timor) and PD (Democratic
Party). This article will argue that this concentration of the vote, and the
reduced presence of smaller parties, can be explained by the historical
legacies of these parties, the role of charismatic leadership, and the benefits
of incumbency and patronage politics.
The article will first introduce some
insight into the mechanics of Timor-Leste’s electoral system. Secondly, it will
then provide some historical context by looking at the results of the 2001 and
2007 elections. Thirdly, the focus will shift to providing a preview of the
2012 parliamentary elections by discussing the dynamics and politics of CNRT’s
management of the AMP government, followed by a biography of the political
players that will contest the polls. Fourthly, a projection of the likely
results of the 2012 election will be proffered. Fifthly, this analysis will
seek to explain the reasons for the anticipated concentration of the vote in
FRETILIN, CNRT and PD. Finally, this article will suggest three scenarios for
the likely makeup of the government for the period 2012-2017 based on the hypothesised
results provided earlier.
Literature on Electoral Systems
The electoral system used in
Timor-Leste is a member of the Proportional Representation (PR) family of
electoral systems. According to the International (IDEA), PR is, “An electoral system family based on the
principle of the conscious translation of the overall votes of a party or
grouping into a corresponding proportion of seats in an elected body.[1]
There are two principle variables that determine the nature of the PR model
employed: district magnitude (DM) and the threshold for attaining seats.
District
magnitude is the number of seats available in each electoral district. The greater the district magnitude, the
closer the relationship between a parties vote and the total number of seats
they receive. According to Taagepera and
Shugart, this is because:
[s]eats
come in whole number while votes are a nearly continuous variable. When more
seats are being allocated, a better fit can be achieved, on the average,
between a party’s percentage of votes and a percentage of seats that
corresponds to an integer number of seats.[2]
The most
proportional system is the single national district, which is the system that
Timor-Leste employs.
The
second principle variable is the threshold, the minimum share of the total vote
that parties much attain if they are to be eligible to receive seats in the
parliament. The objective of the threshold, if it is high enough, is to stymie
a flood of small parties participating in elections hoping to win seats based
on a very small percentage of the overall vote. The smaller the threshold, the
greater incentive there is for fragmentation of larger parties into smaller
parties.[3]
If a faction within a party, for example, is unable to implement some or part
of its agenda, or if the leadership is divided along a clash of personalities,
a smaller threshold might encourage it to split and form its own party in the
hope of getting representation at the next elections. In this scenario, a proliferation
of parties would form and contest elections. A small threshold is general
considered to be at the 3% mark, which is what we have in the case of
Timor-Leste.
These
two variables, when considered together, have been categorised into a
theoretical framework that places them along a continuum of ‘moderate’ and
‘extreme’ electoral systems.[4]
‘Moderate’ PR systems, Germany for example, are those which combine multimember
districts with smaller (M) district magnitudes with a higher threshold;
ostensibly designed to limit the presence and influence of smaller parties.
‘Extreme’ PR systems, like Timor-Leste, along with Israel, Italy and the
Netherlands for example, have either multimember districts with larger district
magnitudes (M) or consider the whole nation as a single constituency. Such an
electoral system tends to encourage greater participation and the influence of
smaller parties in comparison with ‘moderate’ systems.[5]
The
d’Hondt formula is employed to count votes and distribute seats by adopting the
highest average method:
One
seat is allocated in a district at
each of a series of counts to the party or grouping with the highest total.
When a seat is allocated, the original vote of the party that wins it is
reduced by the division.[6]
This
method tends to favour larger parties in multimember districts with small
numbers of seats. This structural discrimination is somewhat mitigated in the
case of Timor-Leste because the entire nation is treated as a single district.[7]
A political party will incrementally see a reduction in the return of the
number of seats they get proportionately as their share of the vote increases.
2001 Results
The
elections in 2001 for the Constituent Assembly saw FRETILIN win a healthy share
of 57.37% of the vote based on a nationwide PR model without a threshold. This
meant they took 43 out of the available 75 seats.[8]
Three other parties received a noticeable share of the vote: PSD – 8.18% = 6
seats, PD – 8.72 = 7 seats, and ASDT – 7.84 = 6 seats.[9]
The remaining seats were distributed to the smaller parties. FRETILIN also won
12 of the 13 district seats. FRETILIN’s total of 55 seats was not enough for
them to rule in their own right; they needed 60 to pass the Constitution. To
achieve this, they formed an alliance with ASDT, whose 6 seats was enough to
get them over the line.[10]
2007 Results
The
following are the number of votes, and percentage of the overall vote, which
each of parties that passed the 3% threshold received. The final statistic is
the number of seats each party won in the new parliament: FRETILIN: 120,592 –
29.02% = 21, CNRT: 100,175 – 24.10%, = 18, ASDT-PSD Coalition: 65.358 – 15.73%
= 11, PD: 46.946 – 11.30% = 8, PUN: 18,896 – 4.55% = 3, KOTA-PPT Coalition:
13,294 – 3.20% = 2, and UNDERTIM: 13,247 – 3.19% = 2. No party in its own right
had ability to form government. In the end, CNRT was able to form government
with 39 of the 65 seats in parliament; in concert with PD, ASDT, PSD and
UNDERTIM. On August 8 2007, Xanana Gusmao
was sworn in as Prime Minister; he would lead the Alianca para Maioria Parlamentar (AMP) or Parliamentary Majority
Alliance in government.[11]
The
immediate statistic that stands out is the drastic decline, of almost 29%, in
the level of support for FRETILIN compared to 2001. FRETILIN maintained a
strong base of support in the Eastern districts; 45.5% in Lautem (down from
62.8%), 60% in Viqueque (down from 75%), and 62.4% in Baucau (down from 82%).
CNRT appears to have been the primary beneficiary of this reduction of support
for FRETILIN. In the remaining districts, FRETILIN took some serious hits, with
CNRT, the ASDT-PSD coalition and PD doing respectably in the Western and
Central districts.[12]
In total, the three biggest parties (FRETILIN, CNRT and PD) collated close to
65% of the vote, which translated into 47 seats. 26% went to other parties,
while almost 12% (50,396 votes) were lost because they were directed towards
parties that fell below the 3% threshold.
Previewing the 2012 Parliamentary
Elections
The task of managing four partners in
parliament and cabinet (The Council of Ministers) has not always been an easy
one for Prime Minister Gusmao. With the exception of UNDERTIM (2 seats), the
loss of any of the other partners in the ruling alliance would either leave
this government on the precipice of losing power, or losing power completely.
Holding onto the reins of power in such precarious situation is not an ideal
situation for the Prime Minister and CNRT; they have big plans for the future
of the country and the less negotiation necessary the better. With fewer
partners, the Prime Minister would also have greater autonomy in disciplining
ministers or members or parliament that our out of line or get in legal
trouble. CNRT’s goal in the 2012 parliamentary elections is to attain a
majority to be able to this, or at least minimise the number of partners they
have to work with.
The Players
This assessment of the state of play
for the political players in the 2012 parliamentary election is largely based
on a reading of both rounds of the 2012 presidential elections. The
presidential election does not provide a perfect guide for the outcome of the
parliamentary election, but it does provide the best set of data available on
where things roughly stand for many of the political players involved.
FRETILIN was able to more or less
maintain its national level of support since 2007 based on the first round
result for its presidential candidate, Francisco ‘Lu-Olo’ Guterres; close to
29% of the overall vote. FRETILIN did see some of its support chipped away in
the East by TMR, who is a popular figure among ex-FALINTIL and current defence
force (F-FDTL) members. It is conceivable that this shift is a temporary
phenomenon and these voters will return to FRETILIN. Additionally, some
analysts have interpreted the results from both rounds of the presidential
election as indicating a slight improvement for FRETILIN in the West and Centre
of the country compared to 2007. FRETILIN, however, faces huge pressure from
CNRT’s campaign to make inroads into the east and FRETILIN supporters into the
CNRT camp. FRETILIN will do well to hold its vote and level of support in 2012.
CNRT backed TMR for the role of
president and if we take TMR’s first round result as an indication of how much
support CNRT enjoys nationally – which is not an unproblematic assumption - the
figure closely resembles the 2007 result; in the range of 24-25%. CNRT has also
been recently boosted by the additional support of several individuals and
groups. One example of this is Gil Alves and his militants from ASDT that were
denied the right to run their list as the legitimate party list of ASDT. Another
is FRETILIN Resistensia: a group of people formerly involved in FRETILIN (its
President Antonio Cardoso, was a former FRETILIN member of parliament), who
have switched their electoral support to Xanana Gusmao and CNRT. CNRT are also
well prepared financially for the campaigning; a recently published list of political
donations totalled US$2.5 million.
PD will be optimistic about the
upcoming elections. Jose Ramos-Horta is behind their campaign and may be able
to carry over some of his impressive first round result of almost 18% in the
presidential election into PD’s 2012 parliamentary result. One of the other big
questions is whether Lasama’s first round presidential result of almost 18%
will be translated into PD’s parliamentary result. This did not occur in 2007;
Lasama received a fraction over 19% in the first round of the presidential
poll, while PD only received 11.30%.
PSD (Social Democratic Party) has
consistently won around 8% of the vote in both the 2001 and 2007 elections.
Lucia Lobato, their number two on the party list, will be appealing her
conviction for corruption. Will this taint PSD’s campaign and hurt them
electorally? It remains to be seen.
ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic
Association) has suffered huge internal problems. Gil Alves and his faction
submitted a party list for the election. Joao Correia and his faction appealed
the legitimacy of this list, and submitted their own. The Tribunal ruled in
favour of Correia and he will carry the mantle and banner of ASDT in the
elections. Bloku Proclamador (BP), which also draws on the legacy of Xavier do
Amaral, will make competition tight in the traditional stronghold of ASDT in
the Mambai area. Along with these damaging internal rumblings, ASDT make
struggle to make its presence felt in the parliament; it may be in danger of
not even making the 3% threshold.
The other parties in 2007-2012
national parliament, and which are competing in 2012, UNDERTIM, KOTA, and PUN
will face a real challenge getting back in. With so many parties and coalitions
competing, there is a real danger votes may be spread out too much for them to
reach the threshold, or make a noticeable impact in the parliament.
There are three parties to watch out
for in 2012: PDN is headed by a former leader of PSD. PDN has a strong
membership base and a large support network throughout the country.
FRENTI-Mudanca (FM) is led by Jose Luis Guterres or ‘LuGu’. He is a former
ambassador to the U.S. and was Vice-Prime Minister in Xanana Gusmao’s
government (2007-2012). He did poorly in the first round of the presidential
election, receiving only 2% of the vote. FM will hope to improve on this result
to attain a presence in the parliament. KHUNTO is based on the membership base
of the martial arts group KORKA. KORKA is said to have a membership of around
80,000. They are a dark horse force in this election. The challenge will be to
organise and discipline this membership into a coherent and effective political
force; if they can do this, they will make waves.
Two individuals to watch: Jose
Ramos-Horta has teamed up with PD’s campaign. He is also appearing on some of
ASDT’s propaganda. He has been critical of the AMP government and has warned of
the dangers of CNRT having dominance of the national parliament. Despite this
criticism, it seems he has come to the conclusion that PD will have to work
with CNRT in the new government and that Xanana Gusmao will remain Prime
Minister. He did well in the first round presidential poll, despite running as
an independent, and it looks like he intends to strengthen the position of PD
when it comes to bargaining for influence and the direction of policy in the
new government.
The second person to watch is the new
President, TMR. It is to be seen to what degree he will be independent of
Xanana Gusmao’s influence. CNRT and Xanana Gusmao were critical to TMR’s
election to President and some doubts have arisen about whether this has
compromised the integrity of TMR’s position as Head of State. When it comes to
appointing a Prime Minister, the amount of influence the President actually
exerts is fairly minimal actually. Though the President does nominate the Prime
Minister, this is only done after consultation with the parties and coalitions
that make up the new parliament; there is no point in nominating someone who
does not enjoy the confidence (majority) of the parliament. The Prime Minister
will be decided by parties and coalitions working it out amongst themselves
first.
Projection of Anticipated Results
I will now proffer a prediction of
the outcome of 2012 parliamentary election. This assessment is based on previous
electoral results (2001 and 2007), but primarily on the 2012 presidential
elections. I will not provide precise numbers; instead, I will suggest a range
of the percentage of the vote and the number of seats political parties are
likely to receive. A word of caution must also be noted about the assignment of
seats based on the level of support because of the complexities and nuances of
the d’Hondt distribution system:
FRETILIN – 25%-28% = 18-19 seats,
CNRT 30-32% = 21-23 seats, PD 16-18% = 12-13 seats, and PSD – 7-9% = 3-5 seats.
I am not confident of identifying the make-up of the remaining parties, the
support they attract, and the number of seats they ultimately receive. I would
not be surprised if the same faces returned from 2007-2012, but the appearance
of different parties in the national parliament cannot be ruled out.
As will be elaborated on in the following
section, I believe we will see a further concentration of the vote in what I
will call the ‘big three’: FRETILIN, CNRT and PD (in the range of 71-78% of the
vote, an increase from the 65% they collectively received in 2007), and a
concomitant reduction in the share of the vote amongst the remaining parties. Some
of the shift of the vote may also occur between these three parties as well. This
share of the vote could be quite small, possibility in the range of 12-18%,
assuming the number of votes lost to parties that fall below the 3% threshold
is similar to that of 2007. This figure was almost 12%; if repeated we could
see between 54,000 (based on a 450,000 turnout) and 60,000 (based on a 500,000
turnout) lost. 12% may be a conservative figure because with such a high number
of parties and coalitions competing in 2012, there is a possibility that more
votes will be spread out even more across these parties and coalitions.
Explaining the Concentration of Votes
The literature on the electoral model
used in Timor-Leste suggests that with such a small threshold in a proportional
representation system, we would expect a noticeable degree of party
fragmentation and a proliferation of parties contesting the election. This has
certainly been borne out in Timor-Leste. In 2007, there were 16 parties and
coalitions contesting the election; there are 21 in 2012. ASDT has suffered a
number of splits according to individuals contesting the leadership of the
party after the passing away of the former, and highly respected, president
(Xavier do Amaral). Leaders of PDRT and
PSD have moved on to either join one of the larger parties, in the case of the
former, and formed a new party, in the case of the latter. The literature also
suggests that the system, because the threshold is so low, would result in the
presence of many political parties entering the national parliament. This
scenario would force the formation of a government consisting of a large number
of parties. This outcome is, of course, in complete contradiction to my
analysis and prediction for the upcoming parliamentary election, which forecasts
up to three-quarters of the vote being concentrated in just three parties. How
can this phenomenon be explained?
This is an intriguing research
question. Of course, it is only of relevance if the election results closely
mirror my predictions. While a risky venture, I think there is enough evidence
available to suggest that my prediction is soundly based and can justify tackling
the aforementioned, though admittedly still hypothetical, paradox.
There are three interconnected
reasons that help explain the concentration of the vote: (1) Historical Legacy;
(2) Personality and Charismatic Leadership and; (3) Patronage. I will go
through each of the ‘big three’ parties and analyse them against each of these
three explanatory factors.
Ø FRETILIN has strong roots and an unmistakable
identity in Timor-Leste, having morphed from a movement to bring about
independence from Portugal in 1974, to resistance movement, to its current
guise as a modern political party. Its heartland is in the east of the country
and still commands general respect for the crucial role it played in resisting
the Indonesian occupation and Timor-Leste’ attainment of independence. The
further you travel west, however, the esteem in which it is held increasingly
diminishes. Its political support has especially suffered some electoral
setbacks since the crisis of 2006 and the concomitant rise of Xanana Gusmao and
his political vehicle CNRT. Charismatic leadership is not a feature that really
contributes to the appeal of FRETILIN. During FRETILIN’s time in government
(2002-2007), patronage played a fairly minor role in how it enhanced its
political position. There was such little money available – the budget had yet
to be flushed with money from the petroleum fund – that it was not in a strong
position to utilise it for political gain.
Ø CNRT is essentially founded on the
reputation, image and personality of Xanana Gusmao. Gusmao played a crucial
role in reorganising the resistance, and also becoming Commander of the armed
forces (FALINTIL) in the early 1980’s after FRETILIN’s early attempts to stymie
and turn back the Indonesian onslaught proved disastrous. He was able to play
an important role in the struggle for independence despite being captured and
incarcerated by the Indonesians in the early 1990’s. He was voted in
overwhelmingly as President of Timor-Leste in 2002. Gusmao formed CNRT to
compete in the 2007 elections. CNRT in some ways draws on a similar historical
narrative as FRETILIN; resistance to the occupation is central to their identity,
but instead of being constituted in the form of a political movement, it is
centralised and distilled in one person, Xanana Gusmao. CNRT is the tangible
political expression of this essence. Thusly, charismatic leadership, that is,
Xanana Gusmao, is at the core of CNRT’s identity and source of support. CNRT
also presents itself as an inclusive, nationalist force that everyone can join
and participate in. As one banner puts it, Xanana is the ‘Father of National
Unity’. The benefits of incumbency will certainly not hurt CNRT’s chances in
the 2012 election as well. Government subsidies and welfare handouts may have
the effect in some voters’ minds of linking such benefits to support for the
ruling party, which would encourage voters to continue to support for CNRT or
possibly other parties in the governing alliance. Patronage, broadly defined as
the flow of support from business and other elite types to parties with their
hands on the reins of power, which is reciprocated by political support from
the same parties to business and the elite through the provision of contracts
etc., appears to be of increasing significance in Timor-Leste. The recently
published list of proposed contributors to CNRT coffers, which totalled up to
around US$2.5 million, being just one example of this behaviour. Such
contributions will further strengthen CNRT’s ability to perpetuate its hold
onto power and implement its plans for Timor-Leste’s future.
Ø PD owes its original base of strength
to the role its members played in the resistance. Situated primarily in the
west and centre, the clandestine movement consisted mainly of students that
operated to covertly support the armed struggle and make life difficult for the
occupying force. The national discourse, especially during the election period,
is generally dominated by the role of the armed struggle. The clandestine
movement is seeking ways to gain greater expression and recognition of its role
and PD is one avenue for it to pursue this goal. Demographically speaking, PD
has a great advantage because of the large numbers of young people that were
involved in the movement in comparison with those involved with the armed
struggle. Charismatic leadership plays a smaller role in PD’s identity and
support than it does in CNRT, but it should not be discounted. Fernando
‘Lasama’ de Araujo, the president of PD is well respected. He was a leader of
the student resistance movement and spent time in an Indonesian prison. He has
polled well in the last two presidential races and with Ramos-Horta behind the
campaign, PD have strong individual leaders representing them. Though to a
lesser extent than CNRT, incumbency and patronage will also work to the
advantage of PD. They had a number of ministers in the cabinet and will have
been able to cultivate networks and support amongst the elite.
3 Scenarios
In conclusion, I will outline three possible
outcomes for the makeup of the government (2012-2017), ranked in order of what
is most likely to occur:
- A CNRT led alliance with PD, PSD, and possibly one other party if it was necessary to attain a majority. This would provide Xanana with a healthy number of seats, in the range of 36-41 perhaps, in the parliament. This arrangement would be attractive because it would essentially be AMP version 2. Xanana would have fewer partners to manage and they have also worked together before. Most of PD’s base of support would also appear to be in favour of working with CNRT rather than FRETILIN. Ramos-Horta has also recently come out and said that he expects PD to do well and that Xanana Gusmao is almost certain to be the Prime Minister again.
- An alliance between CNRT and FRETILIN is the second possibility. Between the two of them, they would command a healthy majority in the parliament. Working with only one partner would simplify the matter of running the government. Additionally, if CNRT invited FRETILIN into government, it would be bringing the ‘East’ back in to the political tent; a symbolic gesture towards strengthening national unity. Arguments against this outcome are obvious: there is too much history between the two parties, supporters and leaders alike. Besides bad blood, the clash of personalities also throws up obstacles; how to divide up responsibilities amongst the heavy weight players with big plans, ideas, and egos?
- The last projection is premised on my prediction about the likely distribution of the vote and seats being incorrect. If a large number of parties with 2-4 seats emerge from the elections, this could make the formation of a new government very messy and tricky. Alliances based around either CNRT or FRETILIN could have to be made with four or more political partners. The exact makeup of the government would be very hard to predict.
[6] IDEA Handbook pp.177-178
[7] Leach. (2009). The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections in Timor-Leste. op.cit., p.220 and IDEA Handbook pp.177-178
[12] Leach. (2009). The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections in Timor-Leste. op.cit., pp.228-229, McWilliam and Bexley.
(2008). Performing Politics. op.cit.
p.77 and Kingsbury. (2009). East Timor. op.cit., p.185
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